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Abstract
There is a large literature demonstrating that positive economic conditions in-
crease support for incumbent candidates, but little understanding of how economic
conditions affect preferences for parties and for particulars of their platforms. We
ask how exogenous shifts to the value of residents. human capital affect voting
behavior in California neighborhoods. As predicted by economic theory, we find
that positive economic shocks decrease support for redistributive policies. More
notably, we find that conservative voting on a wide variety of ballot propositions–
from crime to gambling to campaign finance–is increasing in economic well be-
ing.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
How do economic conditions affect political behavior and opinions? The answer 
to this question is important for understanding the dynamics of policy preference, the 
evolution of public policy and the optimal timing of the introduction of various types of 
legislation. Although the pundits speak of “pocketbook politics” we have little 
understanding of how economic shocks affect political views. We know that a good 
economy is beneficial for an incumbent, be s/he president or governor, Democrat or 
Republican. (See for example Fair 1978, Peltzman 1987, Wolfers 2002). But we have 
little evidence on the causal impact of economic conditions on support for major party 
candidates or for particulars of their platforms.1 
In this paper we begin to fill this hole in the literature. We examine the causal 
impact of economic conditions on neighborhood residents’ support for a wide range of 
political issues. We employ a panel of California census tract level voting returns 
covering eight elections and 91 state-level ballot propositions. To measure tract-level 
economic conditions, we create a predicted employment index by weighting national 
industry employment by the industry mix in the tract at the beginning of our sample time 
frame.2 We then ask how census tract voting patterns change in relation to these plausibly 
exogenous shocks to the value of residents’ human capital. Note that because our human 
capital shocks are coming by way of employment and area employment shocks have been 
                                                 
1
 The closest evidence we have comes from correlations relating income to political behavior. That 
evidence has exposed a puzzle:  Red states are less wealthy than blue, but higher income individuals are 
more likely to vote Republican. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2007) term this an aggregation reversal explained 
by higher income Americans’ belief in more liberal policies, a belief that is learned socially and thus whose 
correlation with income is multiplied in moving from the individual to the aggregate level. Vigdor (2006) 
explains the phenomenon by providing empirical evidence that voters consider relative rather than absolute 
income in choosing a party.  
2
 As we explain in the data section, because of data limitations this is actually tract industry mix at a point 
during our time series predicted by industry mix at the beginning (or prior to) our sample time frame. 
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shown to have long term effects on employment and wages3 (Bartik, 1993 Blanchard and 
Katz, 1992 and Bound and Holzer, 2000), variation in our index represents permanent 
changes in residents’ economic well-being. 
To measure voting behavior, we do not rely on survey data, but rather examine 
the impact of economic conditions on the true outcome of interest, actual voting returns. 
This is an important distinction because survey questions, employed frequently in the 
political economy literature, often do not force respondents to make real tradeoffs. 
Survey questions ask respondents whether they agree with various policy stances—for 
example whether education funding should be increased—without actually making the 
respondents consider, let alone potentially face the implications for their tax bill. 
Additionally, to the extent that misreporting one’s preferences or one’s intention to turn 
out to vote is correlated with local economic conditions, the use of survey data will result 
in biased estimates of how economic conditions will affect actual election returns.  
We find that exogenous improvements to a neighborhood’s economic 
circumstance result in residents’ holding more conservative political views. Using our 91 
propositions we find a large impact of economic conditions on support for conservative 
fiscal and redistributive policies. An increase in employment of one percentage point 
results in a .9 percentage point increase in support for the conservative side of a fiscal or 
redistributive ballot. This result is consistent with Meltzer and Richard (1981) whose 
                                                 
3
 For example, Blanchard and Katz, 1992, find that the effect of employment shocks on unemployment 
disappear within a decade; the effect on wages nearly disappear in about twenty years and employment 
remains affected twenty years out, leading the authors to conclude that employment shocks “have largely 
permanent effects on employment”. 
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theoretical contribution demonstrates that support for redistribution is decreasing in 
productivity.4  
But beyond the realm of economic theory, we find that economic shocks predict 
conservative voting on non-economic issues –like campaign finance and vice—as well. 
Consistent with the state proposition results, we find that positive economic shocks 
increase support for Republican gubernatorial candidates. Our effects are large; they are 
of a similar magnitude to the redistribution results. We then examine this relationship by 
tract type, dividing tracts into categories by initial economic conditions or by party. The 
magnitude of the relationship between economic conditions and conservatism varies only 
slightly across tracts. Within tract type, the relationship continues to hold, of a similar 
magnitude, across ballot issues.  
Thus we find remarkable consistency for economic shocks to shift voting on a 
variety of issues in a more conservative direction. While the relationship between 
economic conditions and non-economic issues is not predicted by economic theory, it is 
consistent with McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal’s (2006) view that increased party 
polarization in American politics is driven by increased economic inequality. Branton 
(2003) finds that partisanship currently predicts individual voting behavior on a vast array 
of ballot propositions from economic to moral, despite the fact that ballot measures were 
originally implemented to lessen the influence of political parties. We cannot identify the 
specific mechanism by which economic conditions drive voting on non-economic issues. 
However, our gubernatorial and proposition results are consistent with economic 
conditions shifting views on economic issues which leads to a shift in party preference 
                                                 
4
 Previous empirical papers have found, consistent with the theory, a negative relationship between survey 
respondents’ attitudes toward redistribution and their reported income. (See for example for example 
Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005; Corneo and Gruner, 2002; Leigh, 2005 and Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000.) 
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which then informs vote choice on a wide variety of issues. Regardless of the mechanism, 
our results imply that economic conditions affect state public policy writ large.5 
Because we rely on aggregate data, one concern about our findings is that they 
may arise from selection rather than from changes in individuals’ political views and 
behaviors. For example, positive economic shocks may lead relatively more conservative 
voters to move into a neighborhood. However, we find that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of covariates to control for selection and do not differ substantially between 
neighborhoods with more or less turnover. Further, our registration and demographic data 
provide evidence that the increase in conservative voting occurs despite the fact that 
relative Republican registration is decreasing as economic conditions improve.  
An additional concern about our methodology is that it cannot separate to what 
extent, within neighborhoods, individuals are voting based on personal economic 
circumstances or based on what they observe about their neighbors’ economic 
circumstances. Note that this limitation arises primarily from the aggregate nature of our 
predicted employment index. Even if we had access to individual level voting data, we 
would still not be able to discern the effects of individual fortunes from community 
fortunes because the employment “shock” is at a more aggregated level.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we detail the 
data, our employment shock measure and our estimation strategy. Section III presents 
basic results, robustness checks, a discussion of the threat of selection bias, and finally 
results by tract type. In section IV we conclude by exploring possible mechanisms 
leading to a uniform impact of economic conditions on voting across issue type.  
                                                 
5
 Our results also speak to the literature on the causes of belief formation. (See for example Glaeser (2005), 
Piketty (1995) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) for theoretical contributions and Di Tella, Galliani and 
Schargrodksy (2007) for an empirical investigation.) 
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II. DATA/METHODOLOGY 
California Tract-Level Voting Data 
 We turn to the state of California for our analysis because the state and its 
residents make frequent use of the ballot proposition. In the 15 year period, 1990-2004, 
there were 181 statewide ballot propositions in primary, general and special elections. 
These propositions spanned the spectrum of political issues from tax and fiscal policy to 
public good provision to campaign finance regulation to moral issues such as gambling. 
The great advantage of inferring preferences from propositions, as opposed to candidate 
choice, is that each proposition asks voters to express their views on a single issue at a 
time. For example, the “Housing and Emergency Shelter Trust Fund Act of 2002” posed 
a redistributive question: Should  $2.1 billion in bonds be issued to provide temporary 
and permanent housing or housing improvements for battered women, seniors, the 
disabled and veterans? In the same year, the “Election Day Voter Registration. Voter 
Fraud Penalties. Initiative Statute” posed an electoral procedure question: Should voters 
be allowed to register on Election Day?6 (The first proposition passed; the second failed.) 
While on each of these issues voting yes would be considered a more liberal position, 
inferences about one’s willingness to redistribute resources are better drawn from one’s 
vote on the first measure.  
 Propositions may be placed on a California ballot by either the legislature or by 
citizen’s initiative. The legislature must seek popular approval to issue bonds or to amend 
the state constitution. An individual may place a proposition on the ballot for either of 
these purposes or to create a legal statute by collecting signatures equal to five percent of 
the gubernatorial vote in the last election, or eight percent in the case of a constitutional 
                                                 
6
 The measure would have also criminalized “conspiracy to commit voter fraud”. 
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amendment.7 Passage of a proposition requires a simple majority. Propositions appear on 
the ballot without any party identification. Thus, another advantage of propositions for 
our purposes is that they ask citizens to make real political decisions without being 
subjected to the immediate influence of a party label.  
Prior to Election Day, attentive voters can learn whether a proposition is favored 
relatively more by Republicans or Democrats by reading official ballot pamphlets.  Sent 
to the voter by the state, these pamphlets contain arguments, for and against, signed by 
high-profile individuals and interest groups. As noted by Gerber and Phillips (2003), 
these arguments provide voters with “potentially powerful and efficient voting cues” 
which typically allow readers to discern whether the proposition is being supported or 
opposed by Republicans or Democrats.  In fact, a 1990 poll cited in Bowler and Donovan 
(1998) finds that 90 percent of California respondents claim to look at the arguments in 
favor and against the measure, more than report looking at the title or the nonpartisan 
summary. A second source for political orientation is advertisements which feature party 
members or political interest groups.8 Thus, the political leaning of the proposition can be 
ascertained by voters willing to do some homework or to read and think critically about 
the propositions in the voting booth. However, propositions do not allow for a quick and 
easy “straight ticket” party vote and thus potentially allow us to separate the effects of 
economic circumstances on party choice from effects on support for various issues.  
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 Because individuals may place propositions on the ballot, one might be concerned about a correlation 
between economic shocks and the type of legislation that is on the ballot. Such simultaneity is not a threat 
to our identification strategy because we focus only on propositions that are voted on statewide, so that all 
neighborhoods regardless of economic circumstances are voting on the same initiatives at the same time.  
8
 For example, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger appeared in television advertisements supporting a set of 
ballot initiatives he sponsored for the 2005 special election.  Similarly Los Angeles Mayor Antonio 
Villaraigosa narrated a number of television ads that promoted a 2006 ballot initiative that would have 
provided universal pre-school to California families.  In addition, well known special interest groups such 
as the California Teachers Association and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association commonly sponsor 
advertisements that either support or oppose various propositions.        
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The Statewide Database, maintained by the Institute of Governmental Studies 
(IGS) at the University of California at Berkeley, provides data on aggregate vote 
outcomes and voter registration for all statewide primary and general elections held in 
California since 1990. The primary unit of analysis in the Statewide Database is the 
voting precinct. We aggregate to the census tract, at which level employment by industry 
is available. (The aggregation process is detailed in the Data Appendix.)  
 In order that our biennial employment index has a consistent temporal 
relationship with our voting variables, we restrict attention to general elections which 
occur in November of even years in California. To avoid any correlation between 
regional economic conditions and what appears on the ballot, we focus only on those 
contests in which all voters in the state may participate. In our eight election years, 1990-
2004, we cover four gubernatorial elections and 91 ballot contests. The 91 propositions 
include all general election ballot items for the years 1992-2004 and 10 of the 28 
propositions on the 1990 general election ballot.9 The most famous propositions in our 
sample are Proposition 187 in 1994 which denied illegal immigrants access to public 
services and Proposition 209 in 1996 which prohibited public discrimination on the basis 
of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin and thus ended affirmative action 
considerations in admissions to the University of California.10 (Both propositions passed.)  
 We use these contests to create our main dependent variable, share voting for the 
Democratic (liberal) candidate or issue. For gubernatorial elections, the definition of this 
outcome is straightforward: the Democratic share of the two-party vote. The average of 
this measure is 53 percent. (See Table 1 for sample means.) 
                                                 
9
 In 1990, the first year of data collection, the state collected results for only a sample of propositions. 
10
 Proposition 227, which required that public school instruction be conducted almost exclusively in 
English, is not in our sample because it appeared on the 1998 primary election ballot. 
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Defining the Democratic side of a proposition is more complicated. To determine 
whether yes or no represents the more liberal side, for each of the 91 propositions, we run 
regressions of the form: 
(1) ynnnnn indBrepBdemByesvote µ+++= )()()( 321   and 
(2) nnnnnn indBrepBdemBnovote µ+++= )()()( 654 , 
where n indexes neighborhoods (tracts). yesvote (novote) is the share of the tract voting 
yes (no) and dem (rep/ind11) is the percent of registered voters who are registered 
Democrats (Republicans/Other or Independent). The means of these variables are .49, .34 
and.19 respectively. We then calculate the relative propensity of Democrats to vote yes 
on the measure as: 
(3) Relative Propensity = )BˆBˆ(BˆBˆ 5421 −−− .12  
A score of -2 would mean that in neighborhoods in which all registered voters are 
Republican all voters are predicted to vote yes and in neighborhoods in which all 
registered voters are Democrats all voters are predicted to vote no. A score of +2 would 
predict the reverse. A score of 0 would predict identical voting patterns in districts 
regardless of the party composition of its residents. While theoretically this relative 
propensity measure varies from -2 to 2, in practice the voting is not so lopsided. The 
measure ranges from -1.02 to 1.23 with a mean of .16 and a standard deviation of .44. 
                                                 
11
 Independent includes those who are registered unaffiliated and those who affiliate with a party other than 
Democrat or Republican. As of December 2007, eighty-three percent of registered Californians who are not 
registered for a major party are registered as “Declined to State”, California’s term for Independents. 
http://www.ballot-access.org/2007/12/24/new-california-registration-data-2/ 
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 We did not constrain our coefficients to lie between 0 and the share of the party who turned out 
(predicted in equations of the form of equation 1 substituting turnout for yesvote). Nonetheless, our 
predicted coefficients were quite well behaved. Of the 364 coefficients of interest, only 7 were predicted to 
be negative. In all cases percent Democrats (Republicans)  voting yes plus percent Democrats 
(Republicans) voting no did not sum to more than a percentage point more than predicted Democratic 
(Republican) turnout. 
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We check the validity of this measure in three ways. First, the Public Policy 
Institute of California surveys state residents about their political leanings and opinions. 
Fielded since 1998, the surveys have asked about fourteen of the propositions in our 
sample. The survey data allow us to calculate the relative propensity of those who claim 
to be Democrats to report voting yes. The correlation between the survey data measure 
and the aggregate data measure is .83. Second, there are official proponents and 
opponents for each of the propositions.13  Using Internet resources we were able to 
collect party information for at least one proponent and one opponent for 50 of the 
propositions in our sample. (The difficulty in collecting this measure is that the official 
text of propositions, by design, does not reveal the political affiliation of proponents and 
opponents.) We use the party information to calculate the relative propensity of 
Democrats to support the yes side of the legislation. This measure correlates .52 (or .59 if 
we focus only on the 29 propositions in which our reference states the party of the 
individual explicitly14) with the relative propensity measure we create using the tract 
data. Finally, we follow the money. We examine the relative contributions of the 
Democratic and Republican parties to the yes and no sides of the 42 propositions to 
which either party contributed money. We find a correlation of .52 of this monetary 
support measure with our relative propensity measure. Thus, our measure seems a 
                                                 
13
 Under the California Elections Code, proponents and opponents of a proposition may submit to the 
Attorney General arguments for or against a proposition.  These arguments are included in official ballot 
pamphlets and are signed by the individuals or groups that submit the arguments.  Official sponsors are 
given the first opportunity to submit arguments in favor of a proposition.  If the official sponsor does not 
submit an argument, the Secretary of State gives first priority to bona fide associations of citizens first (e.g. 
California Teachers Association) and second priority to individual voters.  In selecting arguments against a 
proposition, the Secretary of State gives preference and priority in the following order: (1) legislative body, 
(2) member of a legislative body, (3) bona fide association of citizens, and (4) individual voters (Gerber 
and Phillips 2003).  Typically, arguments for or against a proposition are prepared by the official sponsor or 
by vested interest groups such as the California Teachers Association, the California Taxpayer Protection 
Committee, the Nature Conservancy, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, etc.   
14
 In the remainder we had to infer party from context.   
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reasonable proxy of how liberal leaning a proposition is. We define voting Democratic on 
a proposition as voting yes (no) when this measure is greater (less) than zero. Our 
dichotomous classification yields 100 percent agreement with a dichotomous 
classification based on the PPIC survey data, 66-70 percent agreement with a 
classification based on official proponent/opponent party and 79 percent agreement with 
a classification based on official party donations. The average of the dichotomous 
variable is .45. Because of the greater possibility for misclassification amongst those 
propositions with a value of the continuous measure near 0, we demonstrate that our 
results are robust to excluding those propositions with a relative propensity of -.1 to .1. 
 Classifying our votes based on the voting outcomes for the same neighborhoods 
whose voting behavior we hope to predict may feel circular. However, our results are 
robust to randomly choosing one half of the census tracts to classify the propositions and 
the other half to estimate the impact of employment conditions on voting behavior.  
To familiarize the reader with our data, Table 2 shows the relationship between 
our outcomes and tract level characteristics. We average Democratic voting for governor 
and propositions by type across our sample years by tract. We then merge this collapsed 
data with 1990 census data and run regressions of Democratic voting on tract level 
demographics. As has been shown across a variety of countries, higher income predicts 
more conservative voting in the cross section. This is true for both gubernatorial and 
ballot contests. Tracts with more minorities (particularly Blacks) and those with more 
educated residents have a greater propensity to vote Democratic. The sign of the income, 
minority and employment coefficients do not vary across proposition type.15 The income-
conservative voting gradient is the steepest for the redistributive categories: 1) social 
                                                 
15
 The one exception is the negative, insignificant other race coefficient in the regulation category.  
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(welfare), which includes votes in the subcategories education, health, labor and welfare 
and 2) (taxation and) fiscal. Nonetheless income is a significant negative predictor of 
voting on the non-economic propositions.  
The ability of the same demographics to predict conservative voting for 
candidates and proposition of various types is consistent with Branton (2003). While 
previous studies demonstrated that partisanship predicted voting across two or three 
unrelated propositions, Branton examines exit polls for 50 ballot propositions covering 
issues from economic to moral, across more than 20 states and three years. She finds that 
partisanship (which is strongly predicted by demographics) predicts individuals’ voting 
across the range of propositions.   
Predicted Employment Index 
 We are interested in the relationship between voting and economic conditions. 
However we recognize the potential endogeneity of a neighborhood’s economic 
conditions. Employment is a function of both labor demand and labor supply (effort, 
hours worked, industry employed in). The same characteristics which influence a 
person’s decisions to work in a particular industry and live in a particular neighborhood 
may also influence his or her political preferences.  We follow the procedure developed 
by Bartik (1991) and utilized by Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer (2000) 
and Autor and Duggan (2003) to create an index to isolate exogenous shocks to the 
demand for residents’ human capital. The index, yn,εˆ is calculated as: 
(4) ∑ == k kyknyyn γϕε 0,ˆ   
where φ  is the share of the tract n employment in industry k in the initial year andγ  is the 
log share of national employment in industry k in year y. The predicted employment 
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index (PEI) predicts what tract level employment would be if industry composition 
remained fixed and industry level employment changes occurred uniformly across tracts. 
Tracts in which a large fraction of employees are working in declining (growing) 
industries will be predicted to have lower (greater) employment over time. Provided that 
national employment trends are uncorrelated with tract level supply response, this index 
isolates exogenous variation in demand for residents’ human capital.  To add to the 
likelihood that this condition holds, we follow Autor and Duggan (2003) and define γ  as 
national employment excluding the state of California, thus excluding the labor supply 
response of individuals in the focal tract and its labor market. We calculate the index for 
all tracts located in California MSAs for the years 1990 to 2004. We restrict our attention 
to tracts which are located in MSAs because our national industry employment data do 
not contain information for the agricultural sector. Fewer than two percent of the 
approximately 7000 tracts in the state of California are not located in an MSA. Means for 
the index are shown in Table 1.  
 Because of the limitations of tract level employment industry data our 
employment data are coarser than what is available and has been used previously at the 
state level. Our employment data are grouped into 19 industries listed in the Data 
Appendix. Because of changes in the industrial classification system over time (also 
detailed in the Data Appendix) tract level employment data for the year 2000 are 
compatible with our national time series, but tract level employment data for 1990 are 
not. We do not use the 2000 tract industry employment data as our “initial” year because 
of the concern that industrial changes during the nineties influenced residential and 
industry sorting patterns of workers prior to the 2000 census.  Instead, we use data from 
 14
the 1990 (or 1980) decennial censuses to predict the share of employment in each 
identified industry in 2000.  Specifically, for the sample of California metropolitan 
census tracts, the share employed in each of the 19 categories in 2000 is regressed on the 
share of employment in each of 17 (15) distinct industry categories available in the 1990 
(1980) decennial census. We then use these regressions to predict tract level employment 
in each industry defined in 2000. That our results are robust to using either 1990 or 1980 
industries as our anchor year lends confidence to the notion that our initial employment 
shares are not endogenous to industrial changes occurring in the 1990s. We further 
demonstrate that our results are robust to scaling the employment index by the percent of 
working age individuals in the tract in 1990. This check ensures that results are not driven 
by those tracts in which the predicted employment index should have little power to 
predict economic health because few residents are of working age.  
Previous work has demonstrated that the predicted employment index is 
correlated with state level employment and earnings (Blanchard and Katz., 1992 and 
Bound and Holzer, 2000).   Ideally we would present evidence that the index is predictive 
of employment at finer levels of geography by showing a “first stage”, a regression of 
employment on our index and tract and year dummies using our biennial tract level data. 
But as we have stated previously, tract level employment data are not available between 
censuses. Thus, we first show in Table 3 that the index is predictive of biennial 
employment at the county level and then demonstrate that the index predicts employment 
at the decennial frequency at the tract level.  The first cell of Table 3 presents the 
coefficient on the predicted employment index from a county level regression of 
employment/population on yn,εˆ and county and year fixed effects. A ten percent increase 
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in the demand index increases the employment rate by over five percentage points. With 
our coarse industry employment data and a sample of only 37 metropolitan counties 
across eight years, this result is not significant. The second cell in column 1 demonstrates 
that the result is robust to using 1980 industries, in place of 1990 industries, as predictors 
for 2000 industry tract mix.  
 In order to compare our “first stage” across levels of geographies, in the next 
column we re-estimate the specification of column 1 with only two years of county data: 
1990 and 2000, to correspond with our tract level census data. Across the ten years, a ten 
percent increase in the index leads to approximately a two to three percentage point 
increase in employment.  
 In the final columns of Table 3 we focus on the level of geography (but not 
frequency) of data we will employ in our analysis. In column 3 we reestimate the 
specification of column 2 substituting tract for county data. Since the counties in column 
2 are composed of the tracts in column 3, it is reassuring that point estimates do not differ 
greatly between the columns. We find in column 3 that a ten percent increase in the 
predicted employment index increases employment by about four percentage points.  
This result is robust to the addition of county*year fixed effects, as demonstrated in the 
final column of the table.  
Estimation Procedure 
 Using our predicted employment index (PEI) and biennial voting data, we 
estimate an equation of the form: 
(5) Outcomee,,n = α  + π ( yn,εˆ ) + γ n + δ e + χcy +ue,n. 
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where e indexes electoral contests (gubernatorial or ballot contests), c indexes county, n 
indexes census tracts and y indexes years. Outcome, as outlined in a previous section, is 
share voting the liberal side.  γ  and δ  are vectors of tract and electoral fixed effects 
respectively. Finally, to hold labor market conditions fixed we control for χ, a vector of 
county*year effects. Previous papers have demonstrated that the index predicts long term 
changes in wages and employment (Blanchard and Katz., 1992 and Bound and Holzer, 
2000). Thus, we interpret π  as the change in voting behavior induced by an exogenous 
shift in a neighborhood’s permanent job security. To increase the precision of our 
estimates we weight observations by the voting age population in the year. Because of 
concerns of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and the lack of independence of our error 
term within tracts, we use robust standard errors clustered at the tract level. 
 In the ideal experiment, we could isolate the impact of economic conditions on 
voting by varying employment prospects while leaving other characteristics unchanged. 
We have no such ability to hold other characteristics fixed as individuals are free to sort 
across neighborhoods. In Table 4 we present results from regressions of the form of 
Table 3 column 4 to demonstrate the impact of the employment shock on various 
neighborhood characteristics pulled from the decennial censuses. Each cell presents the 
outcome variable and coefficient on the PEI from a different regression. Outcome 
variables are divided into three categories: 1) economic characteristics which combine 
the direct effects of the employment shock with the effects of neighborhood sorting and 
2) demographic characteristics which reflect pure sorting and 3) summary measures of 
neighborhood change.    
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 In the economic characteristic column of the table, we show that across the full 
sample PEI predicts no significant change in income16 over the ten year period. This 
result masks considerable heterogeneity by neighborhood’s initial income, despite 
relative homogeneity in the impact of PEI on employment across neighborhood type. 
Neighborhoods in the second and third quartile of poverty see increases in average 
household income resulting from an increase in PEI. While the poorest neighborhoods 
see a sizeable decrease in income, most likely due to sorting. The most economically 
advantaged tracts see no change in income resulting from the employment shocks.  
 The neighborhood change column shows that positive shocks to the value of 
residents’ human capital result in population loss and an increasing share of newcomers. 
The demographic results detail that Hispanics and foreigners comprise a smaller fraction 
of the population as PEI increases. Other minorities and college educated individuals 
make up a larger fraction.  
While these decennial results likely overstate the short run changes in 
neighborhood characteristics that result from shocks to the value of resident’s human 
capital, they can provide a sense of the direction of bias due to neighborhood mobility. 
Take for example percent college educated. As PEI increases so too does the percent of 
college-educated tract residents. Recall that in Table 2 we showed that fraction college-
educated is conditionally positively correlated with liberal voting. Multiplying .33, the 
PEI coefficient in the college educated specification in Table 4, by .41, the coefficient on 
college educated in the gubernatorial specification of Table 2, we find that a ten percent 
increase in PEI would predict a more than one percent increase in share voting for the 
                                                 
16
 We use categorical income to calculate average household income. We multiply the share of households 
whose income falls within a bracket by the midpoint of the income bracket and sum across brackets.  
 18
Democratic gubernatorial candidate, just due to a larger fraction of college educated 
residents. Following that same procedure for all eight demographic characteristics, we 
see that five of eight predict an increase in Democratic gubernatorial voting, while three 
predict a decrease.  Summing all eight effects we find, based on demographic changes, 
that the selection that results from employment shocks on net increases the share of 
predicted Democratic voters. A ten percent increase in PEI is predicted to increase the 
share of Democratic gubernatorial voters by a little over a third of a percentage point.17 
Thus this exercise suggests that the results of the next section may be slightly biased 
against finding that positive shocks increase conservatism. We will discuss the potential 
of selection bias further. We first detail our findings that positive economic 
circumstances, in fact, do result in more conservative voting behavior.  
III. RESULTS 
 In the first column of Table 5 we show that positive economic conditions increase 
conservative voting on ballot propositions as a whole. The analysis in this column pools 
all ballot propositions to run models of the form of equation 5. The point estimate of  
-.450  indicates that as a neighborhood’s predicted employment index increases by 10 
percent, the fraction of voters choosing the Democratic side on the average proposition 
decreases by 4.5 percentage points. Scaling that coefficient using the results of Table 3 
suggests that an increase in employment of one percentage point increases conservative 
voting by 1.1 percentage points,18 as shown in the squiggly brackets. Alternatively we 
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 Using the less partisan proposition outcomes, we find that PEI predicts a near zero decrease in liberal 
voting. This prediction is an order of magnitude smaller than the gubernatorial prediction and thus provides 
no evidence that an examination of the effect of economic conditions on proposition voting would be 
biased by mobility.  
18
 The average within tract change in percent employed 1990 to 2000 is approximately -4 percentage points 
or a little under -1 percentage point biennially.     
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can rerun the ballot proposition regression using only the decennial data so our numerator 
and denominator reflect the same time horizon. The decennial proposition equation yields 
a coefficient of -.359 implying that an increase in employment of one percentage point 
increases conservative voting by .9 percentage points.19 The second cell in the column 
shows that the result is robust to a change from 1990 to 1980 weights. 
 In the second column of the table we provide evidence that positive economic 
conditions also predict more conservative candidate choice.  We examine gubernatorial 
contests to parallel our state level ballot propositions.  Specifically we find that a one 
percentage point increase in the PEI decreases share voting for the Democratic candidate 
by over one percentage point. 
 In the remaining columns of Table 5 we speak to the generalizeability of our data 
by demonstrating that they yield economic impacts on incumbent voting and turnout that 
are consistent with previous literature. An increase in the value of residents’ human 
capital decreases the share of the two party vote received by the incumbent party (column 
3). (The mean of this variable can be found in Table 1.) This is consistent with a large 
literature that employs both time series and cross sectional micro data to show that 
willingness to vote for the incumbent party is increasing in economic prosperity. (See 
Fiorana, 1978, for a review of the time series macro data literature. Fiorana, 1978 and 
Markus, 1988, are examples of the micro data approach.)  
 Finally the results of column 4 show that an increase in the value of residents’ 
human capital decreases their propensity to vote.20 (We define turnout as total number of 
                                                 
19
 The scaled coefficient is larger in magnitude than the coefficient on employment in a decennial 
regression of proposition voting on employment and tract and county*year fixed effects, implying that the 
naïve regression is biased upward, or that an omitted variable increases employment and liberal voting.  
20
 This specification includes only the years 1994, 1998 and 2002 as turnout was not collected in 1990. 
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votes cast in the electoral contest divided by the voting eligible population.)21  Residents 
of neighborhoods that are losing economically are more likely to turn out. (While we 
show the results for gubernatorial elections which occur in non-presidential election 
years; this is also true for presidential election years.) Our turnout findings are consistent 
with Hastings et. al. (2007) who find that losing the school choice lottery increases the 
likelihood that White parents vote in the proximate school board election. 
Results by Issue Type 
 Table 5 results indicate that positive economic conditions increase conservative 
voting generally. In Table 6 we return to our 91 propositions to understand if and how the 
impact of economic circumstances varies by issue area. We divide propositions into 
seven categories. The first two types we consider to be the most redistributive: 1) taxation 
and fiscal policy and 2) social welfare, which includes votes in the subcategories 
education, health, labor and welfare. While education and health spending might be more 
readily thought of as public goods, Besley and Coate (1991) note that as long as the 
quality of the public good is not too high, some households will choose not to consume 
the public good, and thus public good provision will in fact be redistributive. The 
remaining categories are: 3) election, which includes campaigns, elections and public 
officials; 4) courts, which includes crime and crime adjudication; 5) government 
regulation, which includes energy, environment and miscellaneous regulations; 6) vices, 
which includes gambling, alcohol and drugs and 7) municipal and transportation. Recall 
that Table 2 showed that in the cross section the income-conservative voting gradient was 
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 The 1990 census provides citizenship by age and thus we can directly calculate voting age population. 
For 2000 age by citizenship is no longer available. We predict voting eligible population in 2000 using the 
following equation: voting age population (2000) = Number of citizens (2000) * Percent of citizens who 
are adults (1990) *Percent of population that is adult (2000)/Percent of population that is adult (1990). We 
obtain the voting age population for the remaining years by linear interpolation. 
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less steep for these “non-economic” issues. The coding of the subcategories is based on 
“History of California Ballot Initiatives: 2002”22 which lists citizens’ initiatives by 
category. Appendix Table 1 lists all propositions by category.   
We run a modified version of equation 5 in which we interact the predicted 
employment index with the seven categories of propositions. Results, shown in column 1, 
indicate that a ten percent increase in the index increases conservative voting on fiscal 
issues by 4.6 percentage points. The figure is 4.5 percentage points for social welfare 
issues. Thus, we provide evidence in support of the theory that positive employment 
shocks increase support for conservative redistribution policies.23 
 The remaining rows of the column demonstrate that the impact of economic 
conditions on voting expands beyond those purely economic issues, for which theory 
makes a prediction. In fact, the impact of the predicted employment index on the five 
remaining categories is of a similar magnitude: a ten percent increase in the index results 
in a four to five percentage point decrease in liberal voting on election, crime, regulatory, 
vice and municipal issues. Hence we provide evidence that conservative views on a wide 
variety of issues are increased by positive economic shocks.24 
 One explanation for the uniform impact of economic conditions on voting across 
categories is that issues in a variety of categories can have fiscal or redistributive 
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 Available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/init_history.pdf. 
23
 We caution that this result should not be interpreted as saying that the demand for poverty alleviation is 
decreasing in economic conditions, but more narrowly that the demand for public provided poverty 
alleviation is decreasing in economic conditions. Households may well view public and private giving as 
substitutes. The charitable giving literature has shown that income increases private giving. (See for 
example Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter, 2002).  
24
 Concerned that heterogeneity within issue groups could be driving our similar results across group, we 
examine the results when we limit consideration to public school bond measures which appear on the ballot 
in 1990, 1992, 1998 and 2002. Once again we see little difference between voting on a particular, in this 
case very narrowly defined, issue and voting on all propositions for the four years in question. The 
coefficients on the predicted employment index moves from -.777 when we focus on the four bond votes to 
-.711 when we enlarge focus to all propositions.  
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consequences. For example Proposition 7 in 1998, which we code as environmental, 
awards tax credits for reductions in air emissions. We consider the possibility that bills 
with a fiscal impact in various categories are driving our uniform results. (We note, 
however, that the similarity of the election results to the fiscal and social results is hard to 
explain under this theory.) To investigate this possibility we recode ballots by whether 
their official summary, which appears on the ballot, explicitly mentions taxation25 or the 
issuance of bonds. As the Proposition 7 example illustrates, these words are not simply 
proxies for vote category. While the fiscal category is the one whose bills most frequently 
mention taxes explicitly, vice is a close second. Social welfare ranks second to regulation 
in terms of frequency of the use of the word “bond” in legislation. (See Appendix Table 1 
for a complete list of proposals and their tax/bond classification.) We once again modify 
equation 5 to include in addition to the predicted employment index main effect, the 
interaction of the index with an indicator for the word “tax” being mentioned in the bill 
summary and the interaction of the index with an indicator for the word “bond” being 
mentioned in the bill summary. A ten percent increase in the index results in a 4.4 
percentage point decrease in liberal voting on bills that do not mention the word tax or 
bond explicitly, say the results of column 2. Note that the coefficient on the main effect is 
quite similar to that of the unmodified version of equation 5 which does not include 
tax/bond interactions.  Furthermore, the impact of economic conditions does not differ 
substantively across bills that do and do not mention taxes or bonds specifically. The tax 
bill interaction is small, positive and insignificant. While the bond interaction is 
statistically significant, it is more than an order of magnitude smaller than the main 
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 In specifications shown, we code tax as 1 only when the tax refers to a personal or sales tax. Results are 
robust to including six additional bills (1992: 166, 1996:212, 1998: 11, 2004:1A, 68 and 70) focusing on 
taxation for lobbyists, casinos, employers and state/local tax sharing agreements.  
 23
effect.26 Even when voters are cued to the redistributive nature of certain votes, there is 
little substantive difference in how economic conditions affect voting outcomes across 
vote types.27  While not predicted by economic theory, this uniformity of impact is 
consistent with the political science literature demonstrating that partisanship predicts 
conservative voting across proposition type.  
Robustness 
 The remaining columns of Table 6 demonstrate the robustness of the result. First, 
we address concerns about the predicted employment index. Columns 3-4 repeat columns 
1-2, substituting 1980 weights, for 1990. Results are robust to this change. A second 
concern about the calculation of the predicted employment index is that the measure is 
relatively less informative about the economic health of those neighborhoods in which 
few residents are of working age. To ensure that our findings are driven by those 
neighborhoods for which employment demand is most relevant, we scale our index using 
the fraction of residents in 1990 who were of working age, defined as 18-64. 
Reassuringly, coefficients shown in columns 5-6 increase in magnitude by about 50 
percent. (The relationship between the scaled predicted employment index and realized 
employment is only about 30 percent larger and thus the implied relationship between 
conservative voting and employment is larger in this specification than in the basic 
specification.) A final concern about the index is that it may be correlated spatially. 
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 Our finding that economic shocks affect voting on economic and non-economic issues is robust to a third 
categorization. We code bills’ economic relevance by how strongly income predicts liberal vote share. We 
group bills into three categories: those for which the negative coefficient on income is above median value, 
those for which it is below and those for which income is a positive predictor of liberal vote share. (The 
final category includes 12 -13 of 91 propositions depending on whether we include other demographics in 
our prediction equations. But the positive coefficient is not robust. Only one proposition shows a positive 
relationship between income and voting, both with and without controls.)  
27
 We have explored various functional forms for the predicted employment index and present the linear 
form because of its fit. For example the square of the index enters insignificantly. Positive and negative 
shocks produce effects that are similar in magnitude.  
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Because of the similarity of their residents’ employment patterns, economic shocks may 
not be independent across tracts. To allow for dependence, we cluster our standard errors 
at the county, rather than the tract level. This is an extremely conservative correction 
given that we control in all specifications for county*year fixed effects and thus are 
identifying solely based on within county variation. Results are shown in columns 7 and 
8. While our standard errors increase five or six fold, our results remain significant at 
conventional levels.  
 We are also concerned that because we classify a proposition as liberal or 
conservative based on the relative frequency of Democrats to vote yes on the proposition, 
there is far greater possibility of misclassification for propositions in which our relative 
propensity measure is close to zero. In columns 9-10 we demonstrate that our results are 
robust to restricting attention to the 78 of 91 propositions with relative propensity scores 
of greater than .1 in absolute value. 
 Finally, we are concerned that our results may simply reflect concurrent 
neighborhood trends in employment and conservatism. We explore this possibility in 
Appendix Table 2. For tractability, we collapse our data to tract/proposition type/year 
cells where proposition type is either fiscal/social or not or tax/bond or not.28 We then 
first difference the data by tract/proposition type and add tract level fixed effects to 
control for linear year tract trends. While the fiscal/social coding suggests a larger effect 
of employment shocks on fiscal/social votes than other votes when we move from the 
fixed effect to the first difference specification, the tax/bond coding continues to show 
consistent effects of employment shocks on votes of both types. For both codings, adding 
tract fixed effects to control for tract*year trends only serves to increase the magnitude of 
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 We enlarge the groupings so that we have ballots of each type in each year.  
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the impact of employment on conservative voting. Thus, Appendix Table 2 provides 
evidence that tract trends do not drive our results.29  
Selection 
 We have found robust evidence that positive economic conditions affect 
neighborhoods’ tendencies to vote conservatively. While the effect of economic 
conditions on a neighborhood is of inherent interest, particularly to the elected official 
who represents that area, we are also interested in how economic conditions affect 
individuals’ political views and behaviors. Because we rely on tract level data, our results 
may be driven by selection of individuals into and out of neighborhoods rather than by 
changes in individual political behavior. The concern is that a positive economic shock 
may draw relatively more conservatives into a neighborhood. This is a nontrivial issue 
given that in the year 2000 nineteen percent of residents in our sample tracts had moved 
into their residence within the past two years. A simple bounding exercise suggests that 
100 percent of our findings could be due to such movement.  
 In this section we provide evidence that our findings reflect changes in 
individuals’ political views and behaviors, rather than simply residential movement in 
response to changing economic circumstances. We provide three types of evidence: 1) we 
split our finding by neighborhood turnover; 2) we examine the changing characteristics of 
voter registrants and 3) we demonstrate the robustness of our results to controls for the 
changing characteristics of residents. These analyses all provide evidence that our results 
are robust to selection concerns. Further, the registration results imply that the bias is 
directed against finding that positive economic conditions increase conservative voting.   
                                                 
29
 An additional concern was that our results were driven by one very politically connected industry which 
was growing because of employee voting behavior. However, our results are robust to sequentially 
dropping groups of tracts by largest industry.  
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We begin with suggestive evidence that comes from comparing the impact of 
employment shocks on voting in neighborhoods that experience more and less turnover. 
While we can never discern with certainty the voting behavior of individual movers or 
non-movers using aggregate data, if selection is the driver we are likely to find the link 
between employment shocks and conservatism is much weaker in more stable 
neighborhoods.  We define neighborhood stability in two ways: First, by the share of 
owner occupied housing in 1990 and second, by the share of housing whose occupants 
are long term (more than ten year) residents in 2000. In each case we split the sample at 
the median defining more stable as above median percent owner occupied (new residents) 
and less stable as neighborhoods below the median. Results presented in Table 7 indicate 
that by either definition there is little economic difference between the impact of 
economic conditions on Democratic voting in more and less stable neighborhoods. 
Coefficients differ by only three percent across neighborhood type. And in fact point 
estimates in the owner occupied specifications indicate that the magnitude of the effect is 
slightly greater in our less stable neighborhoods.  
Our next piece of evidence on selection comes from registration data. We have 
found that an increase in the predicted employment index increases conservative voting. 
If the index also predicts an increase in Republican registration then this is evidence that 
selection may be driving our findings. (The increased Republican registration could also 
be the result of longer term residents registering for the first time or changing their 
affiliation.)  On the other hand if the index decreases Republican registration then it 
seems unlikely that selection into the neighborhood is driving our findings. In the first 
two columns of Table 8 we run models of the form of equation 5 in which our dependent 
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variables are percent Democratic and percent Republican of those of voting age (row 1) 
and of those registered (row 2). We find that an increase in the predicted employment 
index leads to a small insignificant decrease in the share of the voting age population 
registered as Democratic and a much larger significant decrease in the share registered 
Republican. Thus, as we see in the second row of the table, a ten percentage point 
increase in our predicted employment index increases the Democratic share of the 
registered by 2.7 percentage points and decreases the Republican share of the registered 
by 2.2 percentage points. (The results imply a small decrease in share registered 
Independent.)  Hence the Table 8 findings provide no evidence that our results are driven 
by selection.  Rather, positive economic conditions increase conservative voting despite 
the relative decrease in Republican voters. These results are consistent with the 
demographic change that occurs in response to an increase in the predicted employment 
index.  We showed in Table 4 that the fraction of predicted Democratic gubernatorial 
voters increases in response to a positive employment shock.30  
In Table 9 we continue to present evidence that our findings on turnout and vote 
choice are not driven by selection. Here we demonstrate that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of covariates that control for the changing neighborhood demographic 
characteristics. The basic regressions are models of the form of equation 5, but including 
only the years 1990 and 2000. We focus on the decennial years so that in our control 
regressions we can include as covariates the census demographic characteristics of 
percent Black, Latino, Asian, other race, foreign, elderly, under 17 and college graduate.  
                                                 
30
 Overall positive economic conditions lead to a decrease in registration. Similar to the contentious 
Democratic Presidential primary of 2008, economic conditions appear to drive new voter to register and 
turn out. (Ball 2008; Chandler 2008; Ingram 2008; Kaplan 2008; Mackay and Parker 2008; and Reid 2008). 
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In the first cell of the table we show that that an increase in the predicted 
employment index decreases Democratic voting on propositions by 3.6 percentage points 
in the decennial sample. Including covariates attenuates the coefficient by less than 20 
percent, as shown in column 2. The remaining columns of the table perform the same 
exercise for the gubernatorial results.31 Once again we see that including covariates 
attenuates the basic coefficient by less than 20 percent.  
Our finding that positive economic conditions increase conservatism is robust to 
controls for selection. This control exercise together with the evidence from splitting the 
sample by mobility rates and examining the registration and decennial demographic data 
provide evidence that our findings reflect attitudinal and behavioral changes on the part 
of individuals, and not simply selection into and out of neighborhoods.  
Results by Tract Type 
 We have shown that positive economic conditions decrease liberal voting on 
redistributive and non redistributive ballot propositions. This could arise in one of two 
ways: The first possibility is a homogenous tract response. On average, voters in all tracts 
may increase conservative voting across all vote types in response to a positive economic 
shock. The second possibility is a heterogeneous tract response. Voters in some 
neighborhoods may increase conservative voting on some vote types, while voters in 
other neighborhoods increase conservative voting on other vote types, while voters in still 
other neighborhoods may not alter voting behavior at all in response to the same positive 
economic shock. We next examine the relative relevance of homogenous versus 
heterogeneous response by looking at results by tract type. The caveat is of course that 
variation by tract type is only suggestive of variation by individual type. (For instance 
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 Because of the timing of gubernatorial elections, we examine the years 1990 and 2002. 
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results in both majority Democratic and majority Republican tracts could be driven by 
Democratic voters.) 
We first divide tracts by their political leanings. We label as “Democratic” tracts 
those that had more than the median fraction (.6) registered Democrats in 1990. We label 
the remainder as “Republican” tracts. We return to the basic model of equation 5 to 
examine how economic shocks affects proposition voting for these two groups. Voters in 
both Democratic and Republican tracts vote increasingly conservatively as tract 
economic conditions improve, results in Table 10 indicate.  In order to scale results using 
data that are comparable in time frame, the second row of the table repeats the 
specification of row 1, but restricts the sample to only those propositions voted on during 
the 1990 and 2000 general elections. The final row replaces proposition voting with 
employment as the outcome of interest. Scaling the row 2 coefficients by those of row 3, 
we find that voters in Republican tracts increase conservative voting by 1.2 percentage 
points in response to an increase in employment of one percentage point, while voters in 
Democratic neighborhoods increase their conservative voting by only .8 percentage 
points in response to the same change in predicted employment.  
 We next divide tracts into four categories based on their poverty level in 1990. As 
shown in the remainder of Table 10, point estimates indicate that across the four income 
categories voters’ conservatism is increasing in economic conditions. The scaled point 
estimates indicate similar voting responses by the three lowest poverty tract types whose 
residents increase conservative voting by about one percentage point in response to an 
exogenous increase in employment of one percentage point. The response in high poverty 
tracts is half as large. 
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 The results of Table 10 demonstrate that positive economic conditions increase 
conservative voting on propositions amongst residents of tracts of different political 
leanings and income levels. We next ask whether the effect is driven by different types of 
propositions in different types of tracts. We pursue this question by running models of the 
form of Table 6 column 2, by tract type. The results are presented in Table 11 Panel A. 
The first column shows the results for tracts of below the median poverty level. (We 
divide results here by the median, rather than by quartile, for succinctness. The pattern of 
results is robust to dividing by quartiles.) A ten percent increase in the predicted 
employment index increases conservative voting by a significant 4 to 5 percentage points, 
depending on proposition type. Voters in neighborhoods above the median poverty level 
also increase conservative voting on all proposition types in response to an improvement 
in their local economic conditions. Coefficients of column 2 indicate that the increase is a 
significant 3 to 4 percentage points for every ten percent increase in the predicted 
employment index. Thus, economic conditions have a similar impact on voting outcomes 
across a wide variety of propositions for residents of both high and low poverty tracts. 
The same can be said of Republican (column 3) and Democratic (column 4) tracts. Voters 
in tracts of both political leanings increase conservative voting across vote type in 
response to an improvement in economic conditions. Point estimates vary only slightly 
across categories, hovering around a three percentage point decrease in liberal voting for 
those in relatively more Republican tracts and around a five percentage point decrease in 
liberal voting for those in more Democratic neighborhoods in response to a ten percent 
increase in the predicted employment index. Comparing estimates on the various 
interactions within tract shows us that employment shocks increase conservative voting 
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across proposition type and across tract type. Panel B of Table 11 demonstrates that we 
draw similar conclusions from coding the propositions by “tax” or “bond” mention. Thus, 
Table 11 provides evidence in favor of a homogeneous response across tract type: voters 
in tracts of varying income levels and political leanings increase conservative voting in 
response to an improvement of economic conditions. Within tract type, the impact of 
economic conditions on conservatism is uniform across vote type. 32  
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 We have found evidence of the remarkable consistency of positive economic 
shocks to shift neighborhood residents’ voting in a more conservative direction on a 
variety of state ballot issues. We show that positive employment shocks increase support 
for more conservative state ballot propositions concerning redistribution. More notably 
we find that economic conditions increase the tendency for residents’ to vote 
conservatively on non-economic ballot issues. Not surprisingly, given our results on state 
ballot propositions, we also find that the propensity to vote for Republican gubernatorial 
candidates is increasing in economic conditions.  
Our findings are consistent with a growing literature in political science 
demonstrating the ability of party preference to predict voting on ballot issues across the 
spectrum. There is no inherent reason that those who hold conservative economic views 
should hold conservative social views. And in fact what we in the United States refer to 
as conservative social views, are often part of a platform that includes what would be 
referred to as liberal economic views in European countries. Thus, apart from economic 
conditions having a direct impact on opinions concerning economic and non-economic 
issues, one less direct mechanism by which our results may arise is that economic 
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 The same holds true if we categorize tracts by education, race, or income heterogeneity.   
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conditions shift views on redistribution which shift party preference. Then party 
preference informs vote choice on issues across the spectrum.   
And we do stress “informs” choice. While voters lean more on party cues when 
they lack information on the issue or candidate being voted on, our results do not appear 
to be driven by uninformed voters. One simple rule of thumb for determining party 
preference on a ballot issue is that a “no” vote is generally the more conservative vote. 
This is true for 63 of 91 sample propositions. Nonetheless, we find positive economic 
conditions predict more conservative voting regardless of whether the conservative side 
is “yes” or “no”. Voters likely have more information on ballots for which more 
campaign dollars are spent. We find that economic conditions are a better predictor of 
conservative voting on those issues on which money is expended than on those issues on 
which no campaign dollars are spent. The coefficient in a regression of voting liberally 
on PEI is -.479 in the former sample but falls in magnitude to -.085 in the latter.33 
Thus our results indicate that economic conditions shift purposeful voting across a 
variety of issues. Consistent voting may stem from a desire to increase the strength of the 
preferred party. Or voters may choose their party based on one or two key issues and then 
infer their own preferences from the platform of that party. Consistent voting is facilitated 
by the California Republican and Democratic Parties, who are increasingly likely to take 
official party stances on ballot proposals and to contribute money to the proposition 
campaigns (Smith and Tolbert, 2001). The parties attempt to make partisan issues out of 
ballot propositions. Our results, demonstrating that positive economic conditions increase 
conservative voting on state level candidates as well as on economic and non-economic 
ballot propositions, suggest that the parties have been successful in their pursuit. 
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 There were no dollars spent on 19 of 91 votes.  
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
Converting precinct to tract level voting data 
 
For statewide elections that occurred between 1992 and 2000, the IGS matched 
precinct-level vote returns and voter registration information to 2000 census blocks and 
then aggregated the data to the 2000 census tract level.34  For the 1990 general election, 
the IGS matched precinct-level vote returns and voter registration information to 1990 
census blocks.  Consequently, we use census block relationship files, provided by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, to aggregate the 1990 census block data to the 2000 census tract 
level.  For all statewide elections occurring after 2000, the IGS only makes available 
precinct-level vote returns and voter registration information.  However, the precinct 
level data can be aggregated to the 2000 census tract level using conversion files that the 
IGS makes available for each election.  We use these election specific conversion files to 
convert all election results from 2002 forward to the 2000 census tract level.35  
Obtaining an Inter-Geographic-Level Comparable Time Series on Employment 
Our research design requires both industry data that describe the industrial 
composition of neighborhood residences at the census tract level at a fixed point in time 
and that describe changes in industry employment over time at the national and state 
levels. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces a comparable time 
series of national and state industry annual employment using the North American 
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 To match voting precincts to census blocks, the IGS used a straight proportional merge.  In cases where 
voting precincts crossed the boundaries of census blocks, the IGS used the proportion of voters assigned to 
each census block as a weight to allocate vote returns to census blocks. 
35
 The number and geographic composition of voting precincts changes from election to election.  Thus, 
election specific “voting precinct to census block” conversion files are needed to match precinct level vote 
returns to 2000 census tracts. 
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Industry Classification System (NAICS) definitions.  However, BLS does not provide the 
tract level industrial employment data we need. 
The United States Census Bureau’s decennial censuses provide the only 
information on industrial composition of resident workers down to the census tract level. 
A further complication is that because of the changes in industrial classification systems 
over time, the 2000 censuses rely on the NAICS classifications, but the 1980 and 1990 
censuses are based on the previous classification system, The Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system. Thus only the 2000 tract level industry codes match our 
1990-2004 annual state and national employment data industry codes. Hence, in order to 
obtain a pre-period measure of tract level employment, we are forced to predict 2000 
industrial employment shares using the 1990 (or 1980) industrial employment shares.  
The industries identified in each year are identified in the following table: 
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 1980 tract 
(SIC 
codes) 
1990 tract 
(SIC 
codes) 
2000 tract 
(NAICS 
codes) 
National annual 
data 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery  √   
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining √    
Agriculture, Natural Resource and Mining   √  
Natural Resources and Mining    √ 
Mining  √   
Construction √ √ √ √ 
Manufacturing   √ √ 
Manufacturing—nondurables √ √   
Manufacturing—durables √ √   
Wholesale Trade √ √ √ √ 
Retail Trade √ √ √ √ 
Transportation √ √   
Transportation and Warehousing   √ √ 
Communication and Other Public Utility √ √   
Utilities   √ √ 
Information   √ √ 
Finance and Insurance   √ √ 
Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing   √ √ 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate √ √   
Business and Repair Services √ √   
Personal Services  √   
Personal Entertainment and Recreation 
Services 
√    
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services   √ √ 
Management of Companies and Enterprises   √ √ 
Administrative and support and Waste 
Management Services 
  √ √ 
Educational Services √ √ √ √ 
Health Care and Social Assistance   √ √ 
Health Services √ √   
Entertainment and Recreation Services  √   
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation   √ √ 
Accommodation and Food Services   √ √ 
Other Professional and Related Services √ √   
Other Services   √ √ 
Public Administration √ √ √ √ 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Gubernatorial Voting Panel 
(6777 tracts*4 
elections=27,108) 
Ballot Propositions Voting Panel (6777tracts*91 
propositions=616,707) 
Dependent Variables   
Voting for Democrat/Democratic side .53 
(.18) 
[27096] 
.45 
(.16) 
[616516] 
Turnout  .33 
(.16) 
[20331] 
.39 
(.16) 
[616707] 
Voting for Incumbent (of two party 
voting) 
.49 
(.18) 
[27096] 
 
Independent Variables   
Predicted Employment Index, 1990 
weights 
-2.91 
(.14) 
[27076] 
-2.91 
(.14) 
[615979] 
Predicted Employment Index, 1980 
weights 
-2.91 
(.13) 
[27056] 
-2.91 
(.13) 
[615524] 
   
Years  1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 1990-2004, even years 
Notes: Means are weighted by tract voting age population. Voting for Democrat is fraction of two-party voting. Standard deviations are in parentheses and 
sample sizes are in brackets.  Turnout can only be calculated for the Gubernatorial elections of 1994, 1998, and 2002 because total number of votes cast was not 
collected in 1990.  All sample sizes exhibit minor variation within columns because of data availability. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Look at Tract Voting Patterns, Dependent Variable is Share Voting Democratic 
 Means Governor Propositions 
Variable   All Election Courts Social Fiscal Regulation Vice Municipal 
Income ($10,000) 4.55 
(1.61) 
-3.89 
(.02) 
-1.23 
(.07) 
-.38  
(.04) 
-1.26 
(.07) 
-1.72 
(.10) 
-1.67 
(.07) 
-.65 
(.01) 
-.71 
(.07) 
-.63 
(.01) 
Urban  .93 
(.22) 
.05 
(.01) 
.02 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.03 
(.00) 
.02 
(.00) 
.05 
(.00) 
.02 
(.00) 
.02 
(.00) 
Black .07 
(.13) 
.72 
(.01) 
.25 
(.00) 
.20 
(.00) 
.20 
(.00) 
.34 
(.01) 
.25 
(.00) 
.20 
(.00) 
.21 
(.00) 
.19 
(.00) 
Asian .09 
(.10) 
.29 
(.03) 
.07 
(.01) 
.01 
(.00) 
.08 
(.01) 
.13 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
Hispanic .21 
(.19) 
.39 
(.02) 
.12 
(.04) 
.07 
(.00) 
.09 
(.00) 
.18 
(.01) 
.07 
(.00) 
.10 
(.01) 
.10 
(.00) 
.08 
(.00) 
White .63 
(.26) 
         
Other race .01 
(.01) 
.62 
(.17) 
.12 
(.04) 
.05 
(.03) 
.20 
(.06) 
.19 
(.06) 
.13 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.08) 
.08 
(.05) 
-.01 
(.04) 
17 and under .25 
(.08) 
-.41 
(.04) 
-.13 
(.01) 
-.05 
(.01) 
-.12 
(.01) 
-.18 
(.02) 
-.11 
(.01) 
-.24 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.01) 
-.08 
(.01) 
65 and over .11 
(.08) 
.06 
(.04) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.04 
(.02) 
.04 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
Foreign born .19 
(.13) 
.17 
(.03) 
.09 
(.01) 
.09 
(.01) 
.05 
(.01) 
.10 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
.15 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
College .24 
(.16) 
.41 
(.02) 
.14 
(.01) 
.06 
(.00) 
.10 
(.01) 
.23 
(.01) 
.13 
(.01) 
.12 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
.10 
(.01) 
Employed .63 
(.11) 
.13 
(.04) 
.04 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
.10 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
Owner occupied .59 
(.23) 
.04 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
Ethnic heterogeneity .42 
(.17) 
-.09 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.00) 
-.04 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
Notes: In column 2 standard deviations in parentheses; in columns 3-11 standard errors in parentheses. The 1990 census tract 
variables are defined as percent of population, except in the case of owner occupied and income which are normalized by housing 
units, and ethnic heterogeneity which is defined, as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)  as 1 -∑
k
ks
2
where k are the five racial 
groups and s is the share of the tract population who belong to the racial group. Regressions also control for percent poverty. The 
sample size for the regressions is 6769. Regressions weighted by tract voting age population.  
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Table 3: Relationship Between Predicted Employment Index and Employment  
 
 Employment/population,  
metropolitan counties 
biannually, 1990-2004 
Employment/population, 
metropolitan counties, 
1990 and 2000 
Employment/population, 
metropolitan census tracts, 
1990 and 2000 
Employment/population, 
metropolitan census 
tracts, 1990 and 2000 
Predicted 
Employment 
Index, 1990 
weights 
.552 
(.462) 
[296] 
.16 
(.234) 
[74] 
.397 
(.031) 
[13538] 
.408 
(.048) 
[13538] 
Predicted 
Employment 
Index, 1980 
weights 
.556 
(.436) 
[296] 
.299 
(.222) 
[74] 
.399 
(.031) 
[13528] 
.389 
(.048) 
[13528] 
     
Mean (SD) 
Dependent 
Variable in 
Sample 
.59 
(.06) 
.61 
(.06) 
.61 
(.11) 
.61 
(.11) 
County*year 
fixed effects 
No No No Yes 
Notes:  Each cell in the first two rows presents the estimated coefficient on the PEI from a different regression. All specifications control for county 
(or tract in columns 3-4) and year. Column 4 also includes county*year fixed effects. Sample size in brackets. Robust standard errors clustered by 
county (or tract in columns 3-4). Regressions weighted by voting age population. 
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Table 4: Relationship Between Predicted Employment Index and Tract Characteristics  
Economic Characteristics   Demographic Characteristics  Neighborhood Change  
Average Income -1215 
(3955) 
 Percent Black .076 
(.024) 
Log Population -.879 
(.152) 
--Bottom Quartile of Poverty Tracts -7903 
(16634) 
 Percent Hispanic -.547 
(.056) 
Percent Moved in Last 10 Years .209 
(.066) 
--Second Quartile of Poverty Tracts 38343 
(11518) 
 Percent Asian .035 
(.028) 
  
--Third Quartile of Poverty Tracts 18560 
(7786) 
 Percent Other .166 
(.011) 
  
--Highest Quartile of Poverty Tracts -17703 
(5277) 
 Percent Foreign -.237 
(.044) 
  
Percent Poverty -.035 
(.037) 
 Percent College .33 
(.041) 
  
Percent Owner Occupied -.133 
(.038) 
 Percent Elderly .01 
(.022) 
  
   Percent Under 18 .033 
(.024) 
  
Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient on the PEI (1990 weights) from a different regression where the dependent variable is an attribute of the census tract 
pulled from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses except for the last row under Demographic Characteristics where percent moved in 1990-2000 is regressed on 
the change in the employment index from 1990 to 2000. All specifications control for tract, year and county*year effects. Robust standard errors clustered by 
tract. Regressions weighted by voting age population.
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Table 5: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Voting Outcomes 
 Share Voting 
Democratic on 
Propositions 
Share Voting 
for Democratic 
Gubernatorial 
Candidates 
Share Voting 
for Incumbent 
Party 
Gubernatorial 
Candidates 
Share Turning 
Out in 
Gubernatorial 
Elections 
Predicted employment index, 1990 weights -.450 
(.012) 
{-.011} 
[615788] 
-.523 
(.034) 
{-.013} 
[27064] 
-.699 
(.124) 
{-.017} 
[27064] 
-.380 
(.111) 
{-.009} 
[20307] 
Predicted employment index, 1980 weights -.450 
(.012) 
{-.011} 
[615362] 
-.474 
(.036) 
{-.012} 
[27045] 
-.238 
(.126) 
{-.006} 
[27045] 
-.380 
(.108) 
{-.009} 
[20292] 
Notes: Each cell presents the estimated coefficient on the PEI from a different regression using a panel of metropolitan census 
tract voting returns. All specifications control for tract, year and county*year effects. Robust standard errors clustered by tract in 
parentheses. The figure immediately below the standard errors is the implied change in outcome that results from a one 
percentage point increase in employment. Sample size in brackets.  Regressions weighted by tract voting age population. 
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Table 6: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Voting Democratic, by Proposition Type 
 Basic, 1990 1980 weights EDI scaled by 
employment aged 
population 
Cluster by 
county 
Most partisan 
ballots 
PEI  -.444 
(.011) 
 -.444 
(.011) 
 -.660 
(.020) 
 -.444 
(.061) 
 -.528 
(.014) 
PEI*Tax  .001 
(.002) 
 -.001 
(.002) 
 -.015 
(.001) 
 .001 
(.007) 
 -.004 
(.001) 
PEI*Bond  -.029 
(.004) 
 -.026 
(.005) 
 -.044 
(.003) 
 -.029 
(.020) 
 -.025 
(.003) 
PEI*Fiscal -.459 
(.012) 
 -.464 
(.012) 
 -.670 
(.020) 
 -.459 
(.062) 
 -.558 
(.014) 
 
PEI*Social -.447 
(.012) 
 -.441 
(.013) 
 -.704 
(.020) 
 -.447 
(.070) 
 -.528 
(.014) 
 
PEI*Election  -.461 
(.012) 
 -.469 
(.012) 
 -.661 
(.020) 
 -.461 
(.062) 
 -.554 
(.014) 
 
PEI*Court -.465 
(.011) 
 -.466 
(.012) 
 -.670 
(.020) 
 -.465 
(.060) 
 -.548 
(.014) 
 
PEI*Regulation -.418 
(.013) 
 -.406 
(.013) 
 -.716 
(.020) 
 -.418 
(.086) 
 -.509 
(.014) 
 
PEI*Vice -.441 
(.011) 
 -.450 
(.012) 
 -.633 
(.020) 
 -.441 
(.050) 
 -.520 
(.013) 
 
PEI*Municipal -.445 
(.012) 
 -.453 
(.012) 
 -.676 
(.020) 
 -.445 
(.066) 
 -.521 
(.014) 
 
Notes: Each column presents estimates from regressing proposition voting on the PEI and/or interactions between PEI and 
proposition type using a panel of metropolitan census tract voting returns.  The PEI uses 1990 weights when not indicated. 
Sample size is 615788, except in columns 3-4 where it is 615362 and in columns 9-10 where it is 588715.  Specifications control 
for tract, proposition and county*year effects. Robust standard errors clustered by tract when not indicated otherwise. Regressions 
weighted by tract voting age population. 
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Table 7: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Voting Democratic, by Neighborhood Stability 
 
Notes: Each column presents estimates from regressing proposition voting on the PEI for a different subsample of tracts.  New 
residents have moved into their households with the past ten years. Specifications control for tract, proposition and county*year 
effects and use robust standard errors clustered by. Regressions weighted by tract voting age population. 
 
Table 8: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Tract Registration, Biennial Sample 
Denominator Democratic Republican Total 
    
Voting Age Population -.016 
(.030) 
-.235 
(.023) 
-.228 
(.070) 
    
Total Registered .266 
(.058) 
-.224 
(.002) 
 
Notes: Each cell presents the estimates on the PEI for a different regression where the dependent variable is Democratic, Republican, or total registration as a share 
of voting age population in the first row and as a share of total registered voters in the second row.  Each model is estimated with a panel of metropolitan census 
tract voting returns. All specifications control for tract and county*year effects. Sample size is 54152 in first row and 54146 in second. Robust standard errors 
clustered by tract. Regressions weighted by tract voting age population. 
 
Table 9: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Candidate and Ballot Item Choice, Decennial Sample 
Share Voting  Democratic on 
Propositions 
Share Voting for Democratic 
Gubernatorial Candidates 
Basic Controls Basic Controls 
-.359 
(.019) 
[121715] 
-.292 
(.017) 
 [121715] 
-.545 
(.042) 
[13529] 
-.444 
(.043) 
 [13529] 
Notes:  Each cell presents the estimates on the PEI for a different regression estimated with metropolitan decennial census tract voting returns. Basic models are 
of the form of Table 5 and control models include census tract demographics from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses. The gubernatorial elections focus on 
the years 1990 and 2002. All specifications control for tract, electoral contest and county*year effects. Sample size in brackets. Robust standard errors clustered 
by tract. Regressions weighted by tract voting age population. Controls include percent Black, Hispanic, foreign, elderly, under 17 and college graduate.
Definition of Stable: More Stable Less Stable 
Above Median Percent Owner Occupied, 1990 -.457 
(.015) 
[308222] 
-.432 
(.017) 
[307566] 
Below Median New Residents, 2000 -.446 
(.018) 
[272413] 
-.508 
(.043) 
[23957] 
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 Table 10: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Democratic Proposition Voting, By Tract Type 
 Republican 
 
(.56) 
[.42] 
Democrat 
 
(.98) 
[.36]  
Low 
Poverty 
(.043) 
[.47] 
Q2 
 
(.08) 
[.41] 
Q3 
 
(.15) 
[.36] 
High 
Poverty 
(1.0) 
[.30] 
Biennial Data       
Proposition Voting -.342 
(.017) 
[307448] 
-.478 
(.016) 
[308340] 
-.367 
(.025) 
[153917] 
-.529 
(.023) 
[153922] 
-.499 
(.021) 
[154024] 
-.263 
(.02) 
[153926] 
Decennial Data       
Proposition Voting  -.347 
(.027 
[60772] 
-.395 
(.027 
[60943] 
-.384 
(.049) 
[30438] 
-.586 
(.036) 
[30434] 
-.455 
(.034) 
[30435] 
-.166 
(.032) 
[30436] 
Employment .289 
(.077) 
[6760] 
.479 
(.063) 
[6778] 
.362 
(.216) 
[3384] 
.576 
(.097) 
[3384] 
.492 
(.084) 
[3383] 
.360 
(.086) 
[3386] 
Change in Voting for One Percentage Point Change in 
Employment 
-.012 -.008 -.011 -.010 -.009 -.005 
Notes: Each cell presents the estimates on the PEI for a different regression.  The models for proposition voting are estimated with a panel of metropolitan census 
tract voting data covering general election years  (first row) and census years 1990 and 2000 (second row). The model for employment is estimated with a panel 
of metropolitan census tracts covering census years. The employment index uses 1990 weights. All specifications control for tract, proposition and county*year 
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by tract. Below headers in parentheses is maximum percent Democratic (poverty rate) in group and in brackets group 
average turnout for proposition contests. Regressions weighted by tract voting age population. 
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Table 11: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Democratic Voting, by Proposition Type 
 Poverty Democratic Affiliation 
 Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
Panel A     
PEI*Fiscal -.446 
(.017) 
-.389 
(.015) 
-.344 
(.017) 
-.489 
(.016) 
PEI*Social -.498 
(.019) 
-.347 
(.016) 
-.339 
(.018) 
-.477 
(.017) 
PEI*Election  -.469 
(.017) 
-.388 
(.015) 
-.370 
(.017) 
-.477 
(.016) 
PEI*Court -.458 
(.017) 
-.393 
(.015) 
-.357 
(.016) 
-.489 
(.016) 
PEI*Regulation -.472 
(.019) 
-.315 
(.016) 
-.296 
(.018) 
-.449 
(.018) 
PEI*Vice -.421 
(.017) 
-.367 
(.015) 
-.333 
(.017) 
-.465 
(.016) 
PEI*Municipal -.463 
(.017) 
-.365 
(.015) 
-.349 
(.017) 
-.465 
(.016) 
     
Panel B     
PEI  -.442 
(.017) 
-.369 
(.015) 
-.336 
(.017) 
-.47 
(.016) 
PEI*Tax .001 
(.003) 
.002 
(.002) 
.011 
(.002) 
-.005 
(.002) 
PEI*Bond -.117 
(.008) 
.01 
(.005) 
-.043 
(.007) 
-.025 
(.005) 
     
N 307389 307949 307448 308340 
Notes: Each row in each panel presents the estimates from a different regression where the sample is a panel of selected metropolitan tracts (based on either 
poverty rates or Democratic voting) in general election years.  The PEI uses 1990 weights. All specifications control for tract, proposition and county*year 
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by tract. Regressions weighted by tract voting age population. 
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Appendix Table 1: Propositions on California General Election Ballots, 1990-2004 
Year # Description Sub-Category Politics Outcome Initiative BondTax
1996 208 Limits campaign contributions. campaign reform Republican Passed yes no no
1996 212 Repeals law limiting gifts and honoraria for public officials. campaign reform Democratic Failed yes no no
2000 34 Limits campaign contributions and loans to state candidates and parties. campaign reform Democratic Passed no no no
1990 131 Limits terms, gifts and behaviors of various statewide offices. elected officials Democratic Failed yes no no
1990 140 Term limits for various offices. elected officials Republican Passed yes no no
1992 164 Establishes congressional term limits. elected officials Republican Passed yes no no
2000 33 Allows legislatures to participate in the Public Employees' Retirement System. elected officials Democratic Failed no no no
1990 137 Requires voter approval for changes to initiative or referendum procedure. elections Failed yes no no
1994 183 Allows longer between signatures and recall to consolidate elections. elections Republican Passed no no no
1998 3 Establishes partisan primary for president. elections Democratic Failed no no no
2002 52 Allows for election day registration. elections Democratic Failed yes no no
2004 60 Top vote getter from each party primary advances to general election. elections Democratic Passed no no no
2004 62 Establishes non-partisan primaries. elections Republican Failed yes no no
2004 59 Allows public access to meetings of government bodies. public officials Republican Passed no no no
1990 129 Funds for drug enforcement, treatment and gang related purposes. courts Failed yes yes no
1990 139 Allows public entities, businesses and others to contract for inmate labor. courts Republican Passed yes no yes
1990 144 Construction to relieve overcrowding of state prisons. courts Failed no yes no
1990 147 Funds for correctional facilities. courts Failed no yes no
1990 150 Funds for physical infrastructure of county courthouses. courts Failed no yes no
1994 184 Increases sentences felons with prior convictions. courts Republican Passed yes no no
1994 189 Adds felony sexual assault to crimes excepted from right to bail. courts Republican Passed no no no
1994 190 Transfers authority to discipline judges to commission. courts Republican Passed no no no
1994 191 Eliminates justice courts; elevates existing justice courts to municipal courts. courts Republican Passed no no no
1996 205 Funds for correctional facilities. courts Democratic Failed no yes no
1996 207 Prohibits restrictions on negotiation of attorneys' fees. courts Democratic Failed yes no no
1996 211 Prohibits restrictions on attorney-client fee arrangements. courts Democratic Failed yes no no
1996 213 Denies damage recover to felons whose injuries were caused during felony. courts Republican Passed yes no no
2000 36 Requires probation and drug treatment, not incarceration, for some drug crimes. courts Democratic P assed yes no no
2002 48 Amends constitution to delete outdated references to municipal courts. courts Republican Passed no no no
2004 64 Allows "unfair business" lawsuits only if actual loss suffered. courts Republican Passed yes no no
2004 66 Limits "three Strikes" Law to violent and/or serious felonies. courts Democratic Failed yes no no
2004 69 Requires collection of DNA samples from all felons and certain arrestees. courts Republican Passed yes no no
Campaigns, Elections and Public Officials
Courts
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Appendix Table 1: Propositions on California General Election Ballots, 1990-2004 (continued) 
Year # Description Sub-Category Politics Outcome Initiative BondTax
1990 143 Funds for physical infrastructure of colleges and universities. education Democratic Failed no yes no
1990 146 Funds for physical infrastructure for public schools. education Democratic Passed no yes no
1990 151 Funds for child care facilities. education Democratic Failed no yes no
1992 155 Funds for physical infrastructure for public schools. education Democratic Passed no yes no
1998 10 Creates commission for early childhood smoking prevention programs. education Democratic Passed yes no yes
1998 1A Relieve public school overcrowding. Repair older schools. education Democratic Passed no yes no
1998 8 Creates permanent fund for reducing class size. education Democratic Failed yes no no
2000 38 Authorizes annual state per pupil payments to private/religious schools. education Republican Failed yes no no
2000 39 Bonds for repair or construction of school facilities. education Democratic Passed yes yes yes
2002 47 Relieve public school overcrowding. Repair older schools. education Democratic Passed no yes no
2002 49 Increases state grant funds for before/after school programs. education Democratic Passed yes no no
1990 124 Local hospital districts may own stock in health care related businesses. health Failed no no no
1992 161 Allows for physician assisted death. health Democratic Failed yes no no
1994 186 Establishes state health insurance system health Democratic Failed yes no yes
1996 214 Prohibits health care business from denying care without examination. health Democratic Failed yes no no
1996 215 Legalizes marijuana for medical use. health Democratic Passed yes no no
1996 216 Imposes new taxes on health care businesses. health Democratic Failed yes no no
2004 61 Grants to children's hospitals for physical s tructural improvements. health Democratic Passed yes yes no
2004 63 Establishes 1% tax on income above $1 million for mental health services. health Democratic Passed yes no yes
2004 67 Increases telephone surcharge and allocates other funds for emergency services. health Democratic Failed yes no yes
2004 71 Establishes institute to regulate and fund stem cell research. health Democratic Passed yes yes no
1992 166 Requires employers to provide health care coverage for employees. labor Democratic Failed yes no no
1996 209 Prohibits public discrimination on race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin. labor Republican Passed yes no no
1996 210 Increases the state minimum wage. labor Democratic Passed yes no no
2004 72 Requires health care coverage for employees. labor Democratic Failed yes no no
1990 142 Farm and home aid for veterans. social welfare Passed no yes no
1990 145 Funds for first time home buyers and earthquake safety. social welfare Failed no yes no
1992 162 Grants board of public employee retirement system investment authority. social welfare Democratic Passed yes no no
1992 165 Allows governor to declare "fiscal emergency" when budget not balanced. social welfare Republican Failed yes no no
1994 187 Makes illegal aliens ineligible for public social services. social welfare Republican Passed yes no no
1996 206 Farm and home aid for veterans. social welfare Democratic Passed no yes no
2000 32 Farm and home aid for veterans. social welfare Democratic Passed no yes no
2002 46 Provides housing assistance. social welfare Democratic Passed no yes no
Social Welfare
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Appendix Table 1: Propositions on California General Election Ballots, 1990-2004 (continued) 
Year # Description Sub-Category Politics Outcome Initiative BondTax
1992 158 Replaces Legislative Analysis with California Analyst. fiscal Democratic Failed no no no
1992 159 Establishes auditor general as a constitutional office. fiscal Democratic Failed no no no
1994 185 Increases tax on gas to go to transit and highway funds. fiscal Democratic Failed yes no yes
1998 11 Authorizes local governments to enter into sales tax revenue sharing by vote. fiscal Republican Passed no no no
2000 35 Eliminates restrictions on state, local, contracting. fiscal Republican Passed yes no no
2004 60A Requires proceeds from surplus state property be used to pay off bonds. fiscal Republican Passed no yes no
1990 127 Excludes earthquake safety improvements from property tax assessment. taxation Passed no no yes
1990 136 Regulations for property, special and general taxes. taxation Republican Failed yes no yes
1992 160 Allows property tax exemption for home of veteran killed in duty. taxation Democratic Passed no no yes
1992 163 Amends constitution to prohibit sales tax on exempt foods, adds exemptions. taxation Democratic Passed yes no yes
1992 167 Increases top state tax rates. taxation Democratic Failed yes no yes
1996 217 Increase top income bracket. taxation Democratic Failed yes no yes
1996 218 Requires vote to approve tax increase. taxation Republican Passed yes no yes
1998 1 Allows repair of contaminated structures without increasing tax value. taxation Republican Passed no no yes
2000 37 Requires 2/3 legislature vote to establish certain regulatory changes. taxation Republican Failed yes no yes
2004 65 Requires voter approval for reduction of local fee/tax revenues. taxation Democratic Failed yes no yes
1998 9 Regulates charges of electric companies. energy Democratic Failed yes yes no
1990 135 Regulates pesticides. environment Failed yes no no
1990 138 Funds for forestry projects and restoration. environment Failed yes yes no
1990 141 Prohibits business from discharging carcinogens into water. environment Failed yes no no
1990 148 Funds for water conservation. environment Failed no yes no
1990 149 Funds for recreation, greenbelt, wildland, coastal, historic or museum purposes. environment Failed no yes no
1996 204 Funds to ensure safe drinking water. environment Democratic Passed no yes no
1998 7 Awards state credits to encourage air-emissions reduction. environment Democratic Failed yes no yes
2002 50 Bonds for water and wetland projects. environment Democratic Passed yes yes no
1990 128 Regulates pesticides. environnment Failed yes yes no
1990 130 Allows public acquisition of forests providing wildlife habitat. environnment Democratic Failed yes yes no
1990 132 Establishes marine protection zone. environnment Passed yes no no
1994 188 Bans public smoking with significant exceptions. government regulationDemocratic Failed yes no no
1998 4 Prohibits trapping certain types of animals and use of certain methods. government regulationDemocratic Passed yes no no
1998 6 Prohibits sale/slaughter of horses for horsemeat for human consumption. government regulationDemocratic Passed yes no no
Government Regulation
Taxation and Fiscal Policy
 
 
 51
Appendix Table 1: Propositions on California General Election Ballots, 1990-2004 (continued) 
Year # Description Sub-Category Politics Outcome Initiative BondTax
1998 5 Specifies terms of mandatory compacts for Indian gambling casinos. gambling Democratic Passed yes no no
2004 68 Authorizes tribal gambling or non-tribal if tribes do not accept. gambling Democratic Failed yes no no
2004 70 Tribes entering state gambling compact would pay state based on gambling income. gambling Democratic Failed yes no no
1990 126 Adds alcohol beverage excise tax rates to constitution. prohibition Democratic Failed no no yes
1990 133 Establishes funds for drug education, treatment and enforcement. prohibition Failed yes no yes
1990 134 Establishes alcohol surtax. prohibition Democratic Failed yes no yes
2004 1A Ensures local property and sales tax revenues E179remain with local government. municipal Republican Passed no no no
1990 125 Allows motor vehicle fuel tax to be spent on railways. transportation Failed no no no
1992 156 Funds for passenger rail. transportation Democratic Failed no yes no
1992 157 Leased toll roads shall be toll free at expiration of lease or after 35 years. transportation Democratic Failed no no yes
1994 181 Funds for passenger rail. transportation Democratic Failed no yes no
1998 2 Requires loans of transportation funds to repaid in the same fiscal year. transportation Republican Passed no no no
2002 51 Portion of state motor vehicle sales/lease revenues to transportation. transportation Democratic Failed yes no no
Notes:  The rows that are struck out are the 18 1990 propositions that do not appear in our sample. Initiative indicates a proposition on the ballot by a citizen's
initiative. Bond/tax indicate whether the proposition mentions bonds/taxes specifically. 
Regulation of Vices
Municipal and Transportation
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Appendix Table 2: Impact of Changes in Predicted Employment on Democratic Voting, by Proposition 
Type, Controlling for Tract Trends 
 Fixed 
Effects 
First 
Difference 
First 
Difference 
Fixed 
Effects 
First 
Difference 
First 
Difference 
PEI -.544 
(.015) 
-.249 
(.023) 
-.297 
(.049) 
-.525 
(.014) 
-.575 
(.020) 
-.781 
(.049) 
PEI*Fiscal/Social -.004 
(.003) 
-.507 
(.023) 
-.507 
(.034) 
   
PEI*Tax/Bond    .002 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.000) 
Tract Fixed 
Effects 
yes no yes yes no yes 
N 108271 94727 94727 108271 94727 94727 
Notes: Each column presents the parameter estimates on PEI and an interaction based on proposition type. All 
columns allow for tract specific intercepts by using either fixed effects or first differencing. The third and sixth 
columns combine first differencing with tract fixed effects to control for tract specific trends. Data are collapsed to 
tract/proposition type/year cells where proposition type is fiscal/social or not (columns 1-3) or tax/bond or not 
(columns 4-6).  The PEI uses 1990 weights. Fixed effect columns include county*year and proposition type*year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by tract. Regressions weighted by voting age population. 
 
 
 
